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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-3464
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CHAD FRANK,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-04-cr-00029)
District Judge: Berle M. Schiller
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 27, 2011
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 10, 2011)
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________

PER CURIAM.
Federal inmate Chad Frank appeals from an order of the District Court denying a
motion for reconsideration in his criminal proceedings. The order effectively upheld the
District Court’s earlier denial of Frank’s motion to compel the Government to move for a
substantial assistance-based sentence reduction. We will summarily affirm.

I.
Frank was sentenced to a term of 420 months of imprisonment following an open
guilty plea to criminal offenses that involved child pornography. Frank’s sentence was
outside the recommended guidelines range of 262-327 months. We found no error in the
District Court’s application of certain sentencing enhancements, and we concluded that
its ultimate sentence—the product of an upward departure—was reasonable. See United
States v. Frank, 195 F. App’x 114, 117 (3d Cir. 2006).
Years later, Frank filed a pro se motion for “specific performance,” in which he
asked the District Court to compel the Government’s filing of a motion under Rule 35(b)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule provides for the reduction of a
defendant’s sentence if he provides the Government with “substantial assistance in
investigating or prosecuting another person.”
In his motion, Frank made the following general averments: (1) that he had
“cooperated with the government’s prosecution of a large pedophile, child molester and
distribution of pornography ring”; (2) that “the government asserted that defendant’s
cooperation was essential, imperative and crucial to its cause and target of prosecution”;
and (3) that “the United States advised defendant that it intended to make a substantial
assistance motion pursuant to the terms of and conditions of the plea agreement at the
conclusion of the investigation.” Frank also described the specific nature of his
participation in the relevant criminal investigation:
Prior to defendant’s conviction and sentence and in
conjunction with the written agreement, he did provide fact
specific information regarding one Dustan Dennington. As
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an initial matter defendant informed authorities of a ‘boy
lovers’ gathering in Philadelphia and Dennington’s
participatory role. Further, defendant provided authorities
with Dennington’s online screen name, ‘Weatherboy,’ which
allowed authorities an intricate viewing of illicit activities.
*

*

*

Accordingly, the government agents used the information
provided by the defendant, in large part, to obtain search
warrants that resulted in obtaining crucial evidence against
Dennington. Defendant’s cooperation was significant and
substantial to the extent he was ‘furloughed’ during the
pendency of his case for the purpose of cooperating with law
enforcement officials communicating online with other
individuals known to be sexually interested in children.
The Government responded to Frank’s motion by pointing out that “[b]ecause
Frank refused to sign a written guilty plea agreement, there were no specific terms and
conditions of an agreement which the government is now bound to honor.” In addition,
the Government stated that “[t]here is no active investigation or prosecution underway in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of a child pornography ring based upon information
provided by the defendant, nor is counsel aware of any investigations or prosecution that
are active in any other district based on information provided by the defendant.” By
order entered June 14, 2011, the District Court denied Frank’s Rule 35(b) motion for the
reasons given in the Government’s response.
Frank filed a motion for reconsideration. Attached to Frank’s motion was a
portion of our opinion in United States v. Dennington, 399 F. App’x 720 (3d Cir. 2010).
The opinion explained that an affidavit from Frank was used as the basis for a
government search warrant application that targeted the home of Dennington. The search
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of Dennington’s home “turned up a computer on which were stored between 10 and 150
unlawful images” of child pornography. Id. at 721. Dennington was arrested and
eventually pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252. He was sentenced to five years
of imprisonment. We affirmed Dennington’s criminal judgment on appeal. See id. at
728.
The District Court denied Frank’s motion for reconsideration in a one-sentence,
August 22, 2011 order. Frank appealed.
II.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010). The purpose of a motion for
reconsideration “is to correct a clear error of law or to prevent a manifest injustice in the
District Court’s original ruling.” Id.
III.
In this case, no evidence of a cooperation agreement between the Government and
Frank was presented to the District Court. In the absence of such an agreement, “it is
clear that the prosecutor has almost unreviewable discretion over whether to file a
substantial assistance motion.” United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481 (3d Cir. 1998).
Two exceptions permitting federal court review of such prosecutorial discretion
have been found to exist: where there is evidence that Government’s refusal is “based on
an unconstitutional motive,” and where there is evidence that the refusal is “not rationally
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related to any legitimate Government end.” Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86
(1992). “[A] claim that a defendant merely provided substantial assistance will not
entitle a defendant to a remedy or even to discovery or an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at
186. Rather, the movant must make a “substantial threshold showing” of impropriety in
the Government’s refusal to seek a sentence reduction. Id. at 185.
We have carefully considered the parties filings in the District Court and Frank’s
submission on appeal. We conclude that Frank has failed to make the extraordinary
showing necessary under the Wade standard and, as result, we conclude that the District
Court cannot be found to have abused its discretion in denying reconsideration of the
June 14, 2011 order denying Frank’s motion for specific performance. Specifically,
Frank failed to put forth any evidence in the District Court indicating impropriety in the
Government’s refusal to file a Rule 35(b) motion.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the August 22, 2011 order of the District
Court.
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